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RECENT DECISIONS
ion discussing the immunity of charitable institutions could be said to
be obiter dictum.'7 Should important decisions of public policy be
deemed to be settled by a case founded upon such a meager petition?
The answer must be no. The cases involving torts of charitable insti-
tutions are not so scarce that the supreme court would be deprived of
commenting on the doctrine for any extended period of time. Law
offices throughout the state are constantly handling cases on this very
point. Could this strained decision indicate a willingness on the part
of the court to "make up" for the Av1ellone case and're-establish full
immunity for charitable institutions?
It is also possible that the court was dissuaded from proclaiming
further'chaiges in public policy because the legislature will probably
act in this area in its next session. Thus; the decision may not reflect
the court's true attitude'toward the problem. However, it does indi-
cate at least that the court may be following a "wait and see" policy.
The Gibbon decision has done nothing to clarify the confusion
that existed after the .4vellone case, which confusion persists" today.
The basic unariswered issues in the 4vellone case have been ignored
by the court in the Gibbon case. Still unanswered are: What institu-
tions are immune from respondeat superior tort liability? Whitt fac-
tors will determine whether a- charity is- protected by the immunity?
Also, no definition of the word "beneficiary" or "paying patron" is
attempted in the opinion. Certainly charitable institutions, and the
public, would like to be apprised of how much of a payment- would
remove one from the beneficiary class, and whether a different de-
gree of care is owed to those who make substantial payments rather
than receive the entire benefit free.' Answering these questions might
have helped clarify the court's position in this case. As it is, the court
has left open" to interpretation and -speculation the proposition for
which the Gibbon decision stands. Instead of settling litigation, it
will serve to promote further litigation - certainly an undesirable
consequence - until a final determination is made. Considering
these limitations, the Gibbon case cannot be regarded as a firm decla-
ration of Ohio law.
Doi P. BROWN
TAXATION - THE WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE AS A MIARITAL DEDUCTION
In Quivey v. United States,' the United States district court held
that the widow's allowance, authorized under Nebraska statutes,2
qualified for the marital deduction under section 2056 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. This was the first case to pass upon the
question of whether widow's allowance could be deducted under the
marital deduction section since the Revenue Act of 1950 eliminated
it as a deduction from the decedent's gross estate.
17. Id. at 295, 164 N.E.2d at 273 (concurring opinion).
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The "widow's allowance" is the name generally given to the sup-
port payments that a surviving spouse is given out of the estate of
the decedent during its administration. Although varying in details,
provisions in most state statutes permit a court to grant such support.
The first provision for a marital deduction was made in 1948
when subsection (e) of section 812 was added to the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939. 4 Its purpose was to equalize estate taxes in com-
munity property and non-community property states.5
The marital deduction section of the 1954 code' is substantially
similar to that of the 1939 code. The deduction is an amount equal
to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed
from the decedent to his surviving spouse. The most significant re-
quirements are the following:
(1) The amount of the marital deduction allowed may not ex-
ceed 50 per cent of the decedent's adjusted gross estate;7
(2) The particular interest in property must be included in de-
termining the value of the decedent's gross estate ;s
(3) The interest in property must pass or have passed from
the decedent to the surviving spouse ;9
(4) The interest must not be one that is terminable.10
In determining whether a particular widow's allowance is deduct-
ible, the terminable interest rule has presented the greatest problem.
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the widow's allowance is
a nondeductible terminable interest if: (1) the widow receives only
a life estate, or any other interest in property which will terminate or
fail on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a stated event or because
of the lapse of time; and (2) upon such a failure, a third person may
receive an interest in the property and the right to enjoy it.11
Although the Quivey case is one of first impression under the
1. 176 F. Supp. 433 (D. Neb. 1959).
2. NEB. REV. STAT. SS 30-103, 30-229 (1943).
3. Ch. 994, 64 Star. 906.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, 5 812 (e). Prior to this addition, the code provided a deduc-
tion from the gross estate of amounts "reasonably required and actually expended for the
support during the settlement of the estate of those dependent upon the decedent." Such
amounts, of course, had to be granted by the state where the estate was administered. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1939, 5 812(b) (5). The Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906, re-
pealed 5 812(b) (5) because it gave unfair advantage to states granting liberal allowances.
S. RBP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1950).
5. In community property states, one-half of the community property is taxable at the death
of a spouse; under the marital deduction section, the estate of the first spouse to die is reduced
by the amount of qualifying property left to the surviving spouse, up to an amount equal to
one-half of the adjusted gross estate of the decedent.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c) (1).
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 5 2056(a).
9. Ibid.




1954 code, the federal courts decided four cases under the 1939 code
concerning the widow's allowance as a marital deduction. In Molnar
v. United States," under an Illinois statute,13 and in Estate of Proctor
D. Resenhouse,14 under a Michigan statute,15 the widow's allowance
was held to qualify as a deduction. The courts determined that un-
der the laws of these states, an allowance, once awarded, did not. ter-
minate upon the death or remarriage of the widow. Thus, any or
all of the payments not yet received were due as assets to her or to
her estate. In King v. WJiseman," the district court held that the
allowance qualified as a marital deduction because under the Okla-
homa statute,17 once the allowance was approved by the probate
court, the widow was vested with an absolute indefeasible right to it.
In the Estate of Edward A. Cunha,"" the Tax Court said that a spe-
cific monthly allowance decreed by a California court could not be
deducted, because under the California law the allowance would ter-
minate upon the widow's death or remarriage as to any amounts not
yet paid. The court declared that since the award could be termi-
nated after any of the monthly payments, the whole allowance is con-
sidered terminable.
In the Quivey Case, a Nebraska county cofirt granted to the sur-
viving widow an allowance of $2,000 per month for a period not to
exceed twelve months. The district court interpreted the Nebraska
statute authorizing the widow's allowance as providing for its termi-
nation at the end of one year, or possibly upon the earlier death or
remarriage of the surviving spouse.' Under the above conditions,
the district court's holding that the widow's allowance was not a
terminable interest was a gross departure from the previous cases.
In reaching its decision, the court completely distorted the mean-
ing of "property" as that term is used in the marital deduction sec-
tion. The Senate Report on the Revenue Act of 1948 reveals that
"property is used in a comprehensive sense and includes all objects or
rights which are susceptible of ownership."2 However, in the Quivey
case, "property" was construed to mean amounts actually paid to the
widow. The Court could thus logically say that the property was
"consumed at the termination of the Widow's interest,"2' and that
there was no property in which she held an interest which could pass
12. 175 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
13. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, 55 330, 332, 333 (Supp. 1959).
14. 31 T.C. 818 (1959). The concurring opinion is substantially in accord with the Quivey
decision. 31 T.C. 818, 824 (1959).
15. MIcH. COMP. LAws S 702.68 (Supp. 1956).
16. 147 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Okla. 1956).
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, §§ 311, 314 (Supp. 1959).
18. 30 T.C. 812 (1958).
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-103 (1943).
20. S. REP. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948).
21. Quivey v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 433, 439 (D. Neb. 1959).
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